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Abstract. Dynamic pricing is the dynamic adjustment of prices to consumers
depending upon the value these customers attribute to a product or service. Today’s
digital economy is ready for dynamic pricing; however recent research has shown
that the prices will have to be adjusted in fairly sophisticated ways, based on
sound mathematical models, to derive the benefits of dynamic pricing. This article
attempts to survey different models that have been used in dynamic pricing. We
first motivate dynamic pricing and present underlying concepts, with several exam-
ples, and explain conditions under which dynamic pricing is likely to succeed. We
then bring out the role of models in computing dynamic prices. The models sur-
veyed include inventory-based models, data-driven models, auctions, and machine
learning. We present a detailed example of an e-business market to show the use
of reinforcement learning in dynamic pricing.
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1. Introduction
e-Business companies are currently grappling with the complex task of determining the right
prices to charge a customer for a product or a service. This task requires that a company know
not only its own operating costs and availability of supply but also how much the customer
values the product and what the future demand would be [1,2]. A company therefore needs
a wealth of information about its customers and also be able to adjust its prices at minimal
cost. Advances in Internet technologies and e-commerce have dramatically increased the
quantum of information the sellers can gather about customers and have provided universal
connectivity to customers making it easy to change the prices. This has led to increased
adoption of dynamic pricing and to increased interest in dynamic pricing research.
References in this paper are not cited in journal format
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There are several survey papers and general articles dealing with different important topics
in dynamic pricing. See, for example, the papers by Baker et al [3], Bichler et al [2], Dimicco
et al [4], Chan, Shen, Simchi-Levi and Swann [5], Elmaghraby and Keskinocak [1], Kannan
and Kopalle [6], Elmaghraby [7], Leloup and Deveaux [8], McGill and van Ryzin [9], Smith
et al [10], Agrawal and Kambil [11], Reinartz [12], Srivastava [13], Varian [14], and Weiss
and Mehrotra [15]. There are also several well known papers that have set the foundations for
the dynamic pricing problem. These include the papers by Stigler [16], Stiglitz [17], Varian
[18,19], Salop and Stiglitz [20], Gallego and van Ryzin [21], and the book by Shapiro and
Varian [22].
There are two features that distinguish our paper from the above papers. First, our paper
covers a wide range of issues in dynamic pricing whereas the above papers are more focused
discussing specific issues. We have made appropriate use of material from the following
papers in writing this review: Bichler et al [2], Reinartz [12], Elmaghraby and Keskinocak [1],
and DiMicco, Greenwald, and Maes [4]. Second, we survey models of dynamic pricing with
e-business and e-commerce as the backdrop. We have categorized the models into four major
categories: inventory based models, data driven models, auctions, and machine learning.
Our paper complements and supplements several other papers appearing in this special
issue: combinatorial auctions for electronic business [23], pricing strategies for information
goods [24], demand sensing in electronic business [25], data mining in electronic commerce
[26], Monte Carlo methods for pricing financial options [27], and perishable inventory man-
agement and dynamic pricing using RFID [28].
1.1 Outline of the paper
Section 2 motivates dynamic pricing and presents underlying concepts, with several examples,
and explains conditions under which dynamic pricing is likely to succeed. In §3, we provide
a review of dynamic pricing research using inventory based models. In §4, we present a
brief overview of data driven optimization models for dynamic pricing. Section 5 is devoted
to auction based models and §6 is devoted to game theoretic models. In §7, we present
machine learning based models. Section 8 deals with a detailed example that shows the use
of reinforcement learning in dynamic pricing. We conclude the paper in §9.
2. Introduction to dynamic pricing
2.1 From fixed pricing to dynamic pricing
There is a trend in pricing that promises to significantly change the way goods are marketed
and sold. Sellers now offer special deals, tailored for individual customers, and are beginning
to compute the right price to the right customer at the right time. This change has been largely
due to the wiring of the economy through the Internet, corporate networks, and wireless
networks. Buyers are now able to quickly and easily compare products and prices, putting them
in a better bargaining position. At the same time, the technology is allowing sellers to collect
detailed data about customers’ buying habits, preferences, even spending limits, so they can
customize their products and prices. In the past, there was a significant cost associated with
changing prices, known as the menu cost. For a company with a large product line, it could
take months for price adjustments to filter down to distributors, retailers, and salespeople.
Emergence of network technology has reduced menu cost and time to near zero. As buyers
and sellers interact in the electronic world, the resulting dynamic prices more closely reflect
the true market value of the products and services being traded.
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In summary, there are two developments in electronic business which have resulted in a
paradigm shift from fixed pricing to dynamic pricing [2].
(1) Transaction costs for implementing dynamic pricing have been reduced by (1) eliminating
the need for people to be physically present in time and space, (2) reducing the search
costs and (3) reducing the menu costs of informing the changed prices.
(2) Increased uncertainty and demand volatility has led to increased number of customers,
increased number of competitors, and increased amount of information. Dynamic pricing
itself leads to increased price uncertainty and companies are finding that using a single
fixed price in these volatile Internet markets is ineffective and inefficient.
2.2 Dynamic pricing: Definitions
Dynamic pricing is the dynamic adjustment of prices to consumers depending upon the value
these customers attribute to a product or service [12]. In the literature, several alternative
terms have been used to describe dynamic pricing. These include flexible pricing and cus-
tomized pricing. Dynamic pricing includes two aspects: (1) price dispersion and (2) price
discrimination. Price dispersion can be spatial or temporal. In spatial price dispersion, several
sellers offer a given item at different prices. In temporal price dispersion, a given store varies
its price for a given good over time, based on the time of sale and supply-demand situation.
The other aspect of dynamic pricing is differential pricing or price discrimination, where
different prices are charged to different consumers for the same product. There are three types
here [29,14].
 First degree (or perfect) differentiation: A producer sells different units of output for differ-
ent prices and these prices can differ from person to person. Here, each unit of the good is
sold to the individual who values it most highly, at the maximum price that this individual
is willing to pay for the item. If the producer has sufficient information about to determine
the maximum willingness to pay for each customer, this method will be able to extract the
entire consumer surplus from the market.
 Second degree price differentiation: This is also called as nonlinear pricing and means that
the producer sells different units of output for different prices but every individual who buys
the same amount of the product pays the same amount. Thus prices depend on the amount
of the product purchased, but not on who does the purchasing. Examples include quantity
discounts and premiums. Another example is public utilities; for instance, the price per unit
of electricity often depends on how much is bought.
 Third degree price differentiation: This occurs when the producer sells products to different
people for different prices, but every unit of product sold to a given person sells for the same
price. Price differentiation is achieved by exploiting differences in consumer valuations.
An example is group pricing (senior citizens, students, etc.). Another example is telecom
pricing (differential pricing for businesses and households).
Often times, price differentiation is achieved through product differentiation. The latter is
achieved through additional attributes or by generalizing existing attributes. By differentiating
products, sellers can decrease the substitutability of their products and services and customize
offers to the requirements of specific consumers or market segments. An immediate example
is that of Dell computers, where every computer it sells is unique because it reflects the unique
set of choice options exercised by each buyer. Another example is the airline industry where
the products are differentiated on the basis of refund policies, cancellation restrictions, week-
end stays etc.
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Elmaghraby and Keskinocak [1] categorize dynamic pricing methods into two broad cate-
gories: Posted price mechanisms and price discovery mechanisms. Under the first category,
a product or service is sold at a take-it-or-leave-it price determined by the seller. The posted
prices could be dynamic, in the sense that the seller changes prices dynamically over time
depending on the time of sale, demand information, and supply availability. In price dis-
covery mechanisms, prices are determined through a bidding process. Auctions provide an
immediate example.
The phrase flexible pricing is often used to denote dynamic pricing. Bichler et al [2] use
this term in a broader sense. They distinguish between differential pricing (different buyers
receive different prices based on expected valuations) and dynamic pricing (prices are based
on bids by market participants), and use the term flexible pricing to refer to both.
In our paper, we use the term dynamic pricing in a broad sense. It would refer in general
to dynamic adjustment of prices to consumers. It would include differential pricing, price
dispersion, dynamic posted prices, price discovery etc.
2.3 Examples of dynamic pricing
The airline industry is a common example of deployment of dynamic pricing strategies. The
kind of pricing strategy followed here is popularly known as yield management or revenue
management [9,10,30]. Essentially, the method here is to dynamically modulate prices over
time by adjusting the number of seats available in each pre-defined fare class. Advantage
is taken of a natural segmentation in the consumers: business travellers for whom the flight
dates and timings are primary and fares are secondary; casual travellers for whom prices are
important and the dates/timings are flexible; and hybrids for whom both factors are at an
equal level of importance. Yield management systems essentially forecast demand, closely
monitor bookings, and dynamically adjust seats available in each segment, so as to maximize
profits. This method is currently being practiced in hotel rooms, cruises, rental cars, etc. Boyd
and Bilegan [30] survey revenue or yield management techniques to illustrate a successful
e-commerce model of dynamic, automated sales enabled by central reservation and revenue
optimization systems.
Priceline.com allows travellers to name their price for an airline ticket booked at the last
minute and get for example a ticket from Boston to San Francisco at USD 275 instead of
the full fare of USD 750. Priceline.com uses complex software that enables major airlines to
fill unsold seats at marginal revenues. The business model of Priceline.com is attractive for
airlines since it can generate additional revenues on seats that would have otherwise gone
unsold. Transactions through Priceline.com do not influence buyers with high willingness to
pay since a number of serious restrictions apply to the cheaper tickets.
Auction sites such as Ebay.com and Onsale.com have been successfully running auctions
where people participate outbidding one another to purchase computers, electronics, sports
equipment, etc. at dynamic prices that are governed by supply-demand characteristics.
Computer manufacturers such as Sun Microsystems and IBM have been selling increasing
numbers of servers via auctions. Dell sells custom PC configurations at prices which are
different for different configurations. The Dell model is the ultimate in price differentiation
in the sense of being implemented in terms of product differentiation. Dell quotes different
prices to different market segments for the same product, enabling the company to increase
the profitability [31]. Dell and Cisco generate almost 50 % of their sales through the Internet.
Currently, a good percentage of automobiles are being purchased through web sites and
dynamic pricing is being followed in some of the sites. Autobyte1.com is a company that
enables car buyers to submit a request for bids on cars they wish to purchase. There are many
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other sites that enable used cars to be sold through the web. By identifying product features
for which consumers are willing to pay a premium, the Ford motor company has developed
a pricing strategy that encourages consumers to purchase more expensive vehicles, resulting
in a marked increase in revenue and profits [32]. Similarly, General Motors is set to use the
data generated from their Auto Choice Adviser website to come up with revenue maximizing
dynamic prices for their cars [33].
In September 2000, Amazon.com experimented with prices on their most popular DVDs.
Depending on the supply and demand, the prices on a particular DVD varied over a wide
range. Customers found out about this and reacted in anger at what they saw as random prices
on a commodity which is plenty in supply. Thus price fluctuations can often lead to reduced
loyalty from customers if fairness is not perceived.
Buy.com [34,4] uses software agents to search web sites of competitors for competitive
prices and in response, Buy.com lowers its price to match these prices. The pricing strategy
here is based on the assumption that their customers are extremely price sensitive and will
choose to purchase from the seller offering the lowest price. This has resulted in Buy.com
register high volumes of trade, however due to the low prices, the profits are low, often times
even negative. This example illustrates that overly simplistic or incorrect model of buyer
behaviour can produce undesirable results.
2.4 When will dynamic pricing succeed?
Price customization has become an integral part of electronic commerce these days and is
widely accepted. However, the most ideal form of this practice is not yet implemented [12].
A customer’s (buyer’s) willingness to pay (WTP) is the ultimate discriminatory variable (or
first degree price customization). See figure 1 [12]. The first part of the figure corresponds to
a fixed pricing scenario. Here, the firm will do business with customers 4 and 5 since their
WTP exceeds the company’s market price. In the customized pricing scenario (second part
of figure 1), there is a distribution of prices with the mean of the distribution converging to
the target price. Here, the firm will do business with customers 2,3,4, and 5 since their WTP
exceeds the company’s break-even price. Profits will be much higher in the second case.
The difficulty with customized pricing based on WTP is the implementation. Finding out
the WTP is not always trivial. Secondly the administrative costs of establishing individual
prices can be very high. The advent of the Internet has certainly helped overcome the second
difficulty. Technological advances have certainly removed a barrier in implementing dynamic
pricing in on-line environments, however a more fundamental question raised by Reinartz [12].
According to him, there are five conditions that must hold for any type of price customization
to work, as below.
(1) Customers must be heterogeneous in their willingness to pay, that is they should be willing
to pay different prices for the same products or services.
(2) The market must be segmentable, that is, it should be possible to identify different groups of
buyers. The web has significantly improved a company’s ability to profile their customers
and track their behaviour. Two examples: (1) A grocery customer might sort products by
price before choosing (price-sensitive customer) or might use non-price attributes like
brand name or quality to shortlist and select (price-insensitive customer). (2) In airlines
booking, a business customer is sensitive to the time and date of departure while a price-
sensitive customer wishes to choose the minimum price schedule.
(3) Arbitrage should be limited, that is, a customer who bought a product at a lower price
should not be able to resell it for profit to customers who have a higher willingness-to-pay.
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Figure 1. Fixed pricing versus dynamic
pricing.
For example, a cheaper airline ticket has so many restrictions that to resell it at a higher
price is almost impossible.
(4) The cost of segmenting and price differentiation must not exceed revenue due to price cus-
tomization. For example, airlines have some of the most sophisticated price customization
schemes which took millions of dollars to implement. However, these schemes have led
to revenues that are far in excess of the setup costs, leading to the successful deployment
of dynamic pricing schemes. Similarly, the presence of companies like Priceline.com has
helped the airline industry by generating additional revenues on seats that would have
otherwise gone unsold.
(5) Customers should perceive fairness while dealing with a vendor who practices dynamic
pricing.
Today’s economy is ready for dynamic pricing, however, the prices will have to be adjusted
in fairly sophisticated ways to reap the benefits of dynamic pricing. In the rest of this paper,
we look into such dynamic pricing models.
2.5 Models used in dynamic pricing
A variety of mathematical models have been used in computing dynamic prices. Most of
these models formulate the dynamic pricing problem as an optimization problem. Depending
on the specific mathematical tool used and emphasized, we provide a list of five categories
of models.
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 Inventory-based models: These are models where pricing decisions are primarily based on
inventory levels and customer service levels.
 Data-driven models: These models use statistical or similar techniques for utilizing data
available about customer preferences and buying patterns to compute optimal dynamic
prices.
 Game theory models: In a multi-seller scenario, the sellers may compete for the same pool
of customers and this induces a dynamic pricing game among the sellers. Game theoretic
models lead to interesting ways of computing optimal dynamic prices in such situations.
 Machine learning models: An e-business market provides a rich playground for online
learning by buyers and sellers. Sellers can potentially learn buyer preferences and buying
patterns and use algorithms to dynamically price their offerings so as to maximize revenues
or profits.
 Simulation models: It is well known that simulation can always be used in any decision
making problem. A simulation model for dynamic pricing may use any of the above four
models stated above or use a prototype system or any other way of mimicking the dynamics
of the system.
The above way of categorizing dynamic pricing models is in no way a conclusive way. The
categorization is neither mutually exclusive nor jointly exhaustive. A certain dynamic pricing
scheme may include two or more of the above types. A given type of a model may use another
type. For example, inventory based models could be data driven. Machine learning models may
be data driven. Machine learning models may use inventory levels in their learning algorithms
etc. Simulation is relevant for all the other types of models. In this paper, we provide a brief
survey of inventory based models, data driven models, game theory models, and machine
learning models. We also present a detailed example to show the use of reinforcement learning
in e-business dynamic pricing. We do not discuss simulation as a separate topic since as
already stated, simulation is relevant for all the models.
3. Inventory-based models
Dynamic pricing in retail markets based on inventory considerations has been researched quite
extensively. Early works include that of Varian [18] and Salop and Stiglitz [20]. Elmaghraby
and Keskinocak [1], Swann [35], and Chan, Shen, Simchi-Levi, and Swann [5] provide a
comprehensive review of models of traditional retail markets where inventories are used as
the main consideration for determining optimal prices. Many of these results are applicable to
e-business markets since most retailers have web-enabled e-business operations. We provide
a brief overview of some important results here.
Elmaghraby and Keskinocak [1] discuss three main characteristics of a market environment
that influence the type of dynamic pricing problem a retailer faces:
 Replenishment vs no-replenishment of inventory (R/NR): In a given time horizon, whether
the seller would make pricing decisions given a fixed amount of inventory or inventory can
be replenished over time to supply the demand.
 Dependent vs independent Demand over time: Customers demand of a product may change
over time.
 Myopic vs strategic customers (M/S): The purchasing behaviour of the customers affects
the seller’s decision over time. Myopic customers make a purchase, if the price is below
his valuation. Strategic customers take into account the future path of prices when making
purchasing decisions.
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According to these authors, most existing markets can be classified under three categories:
NRIM (no replenishment of inventory–independent demands–myopic customers), NRIS (no
replenishment of inventory–independent demands–strategic customers), and RIM (replenish-
ment of inventory–independent demands–myopic customers). Examples of NRIM include
fashion apparel or holiday products while RIM situation appears in grocery items, produce,
and pharmaceutical products. NRIS category is typical business-to-business procurement.
The paper provides a comprehensive review of the literature for the above three categories,
summarizing all the important results. Most of the results available are for single seller monop-
olistic markets.
Gallego and van Ryzin [21] consider optimal dynamic pricing of inventories with stochastic
demand over finite horizon. The assumptions made here are: (1) The market is a monopolist
market, (2) the selling horizon is finite, (3) the store has a finite stock of items with no
replenishment during the selling horizon, (4) demand decreases in price, and (5) unsold items
have a salvage value. Gallego and van Ryzin model the demand as a Poisson process with
intensity .p/ where .p/ is increasing in p. By charging price pt at time t , the firm controls
the intensity of the demand. They show under suitable assumptions that: (a) more stock and/or
longer remaining time to sell goods leads to higher expected revenues; (b) at a given point
in time, the optimal price decreases as the inventory increases - conversely, for a given level
of inventory, the optimal price rises if there is more time to sell. The optimal pricing policies
derived call for continuous updating of prices over time, which may not always be practical.
The authors investigate heuristic pricing policies with more stable prices. They also look at
the case where prices have to be chosen from a discrete set of allowable prices.
Federgruen and Heching [36] consider the optimal inventory and pricing policy of a seller
who faces an uncertain demand where prices are changed periodically over time. In each
period, before demand is realized, the seller must decide the quantity to produce, qt , given his
starting inventory position xt , where t denotes the number of periods remaining. Equivalently,
the seller decides how much of inventory yt to have on hand at the start of the period. It is
found that a base stock list price (BSLP) policy is optimal under a wide range of settings.
A BSLP policy is defined as follows: (a) if the inventory at the start of the period t , xt , is
less than some base stock level bt , produce enough to bring the inventory level up to bt and
charge pt , (b) if xt is greater than bt , produce nothing and offer the product at a discounted
price of pt.xt / where pt is a decreasing function of xt . When the time horizon is infinity,
the authors consider two different objectives. When the seller wishes to maximize expected
discounted profits, they find that BSLP is optimal. If the seller wishes to maximize average
long run profits, then the optimal pricing policy will be a BSLP policy if prices are allowed
to move freely.
Bernstein and Federgruen [37,38] consider inventory based pricing in a two echelon supply
chain with random demands. The approach used is based on game theory and is reviewed in §6.
Learning Curve Simulator [4] is a market simulator, designed and implemented at the MIT
Media Labs, for analyzing inventory based dynamic pricing strategies in markets under finite
time horizons and fluctuating buyer demands. It can simulate finite markets, that is markets
with a finite time horizon, finite seller inventories, and finite buyer population. It can model a
wide variety of buyer behaviours and a wide variety of seller strategies. Using this simulator,
DiMicco, Greenwald, and Maes [39,4] compare several inventory based dynamic pricing
strategies in a single seller market.
Biller, Cha, Simchi-Levi, and Swann [40] propose a strategy that incorporates dynamic
pricing, direct-to-customer model, production scheduling, and inventory control under pro-
duction capacity limits in a multi-period horizon to improve the revenue and supply chain
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performance in automotive industry. They formulate the dynamic pricing problem as an opti-
mization problem maximizing total revenue minus holding costs and production costs subject
to inventory constraints and production capacity constraints. The problem turns out to be a
min-cost network flow problem with convex cost. Their analysis shows that it is possible to
achieve significant increase of revenue with dynamic pricing.
We have described here only a few representative models for inventory based dynamic
pricing. The reader is referred to the papers by Elmaghraby and Keskinocak [1], Swann [35],
and Chan, Shen, Simchi-Levi, and Swann [5] for more details.
4. Data-driven models
Availability of customer data through e-business web sites has opened up enormous oppor-
tunities for revenue enhancing measures. E-business sites such as amazon.com, yahoo.com,
and the private marketplaces of all leading manufacturing and service companies accumulate
huge amounts of data about customers which they can leverage to improve their revenues
and profits. In fact, sophisticated data mining algorithms are being developed to make best
use of customer data. See the survey on data mining approaches by Raghavan [26] in this
special issue. Dynamic pricing is one of the areas significantly impacted by the availability
of customer data and data mining algorithms.
We provide several examples of a data driven approach for dynamic pricing. The first
example is that of revenue or yield management which are traditionally are driven by customer
data. Airlines and the hospitality industry have adopted these techniques quite successfully.
Boyd and Bilegan [30] survey revenue management techniques to illustrate a successful e-
commerce model of dynamic, automated sales enabled by central reservation and revenue
optimization systems. Morris et al [41] examine the dynamic pricing strategies in the airlines
industry by discovering patterns in customer preferences. Two adaptive seller-side pricing
strategies are presented and evaluated using a Java-based market simulator, Arena. Using the
simulator, reserve pricing strategy and seat releasing strategy are compared with the base case
in three conditions of increasing, decreasing, and constant customer demands. The results
reveal the fact that, by adjusting the reserve price based on the number of seats sold so far in
the simulation, the derivative following nature of the reserve pricing strategy was able to track
demand very well and increased the revenue over the base case. In contrast, a myopically
optimal strategy of adjusting the number of seats released according to the demand level did
not succeed in increasing the revenue, in the airline-bidding scenario. A combination of both
of these strategies or new invented strategies was simulated with the fluctuating customer
demand levels to achieve finer tuning of both reserve price and number of seats released per
day and optimize the revenue generation.
By identifying product features for which consumers are willing to pay a premium, the
Ford motor company has developed a pricing strategy that encourages consumers to purchase
more expensive vehicles, resulting in a marked increase in revenue and profits [32].
Rusmevichientong, Salisbury, Tuuss, Van Roy, and Glynn [33] have developed a non-
parametric, data-driven approach [42] to determining optimal dynamic prices that uses on-
line data on consumer preferences collected through a web site Auto Choice Adviser web
site developed by General Motors. Using the data available from the web site, the authors
formulate a revenue optimization problem. The problem turns out to be NP-hard. The authors
develop an efficient heuristic method to solve the problem when the objective function is
super-modular. General Motors is all set to use the above model which uses the data generated
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from their Auto Choice Adviser website to come up with revenue maximizing dynamic prices
for their cars [33].
Once customer data becomes available through web sites and customer relationship man-
agement software, a variety of techniques can be used for analyzing and using this data for
determining better ways of pricing. Statistical/machine learning techniques are quite popular
here.
5. Auction-based models
Auctions constitute a natural model for dynamic pricing. The outcome of an auction is deter-
mined by supply-demand characteristics and therefore the prices as determined by an auction
can truly be based on market conditions, provided the bidders reveal their true valuations.
Auction mechanisms can be designed to have truth revelation properties and the theory of
auctions has a great deal to offer to the area of dynamic pricing. Auctions achieve high rates
of Pareto efficiency [2] and exhibit rapid convergence to equilibrium. These features would
be very attractive in an environment where large companies are buying direct or indirect
materials from suppliers who depend on them for a significant portion of their revenue.
Auctions are now possibly the most popular mechanism for implementing price negotia-
tions B2B situations. General Electric has adopted online auctions for most of its procurement
operations, conducting more than 6 billion online auctions in 2000 [43], which led to the
Internet Week magazine awarding the title “e-Business of the Year 2000.” Numerous major
companies have either used or are in the process of using auction-based methods or internet-
based automated negotiations for their procurement/selling operations. There are many pub-
lished case studies of successful deployment of e-auctions in procurement (for example, see
[44–46]) and in selling (for example, see the survey by Narahari and Dayama [23]).
Auctions are also easily the most popular dynamic pricing mechanism in B2C situations
as shown by the success of ebay auctions, yahoo auctions, amazon auctions, and numerous
auction sites for air tickets, used cars, entertainment coupons, hotel reservations, etc.
Auctions can take several forms and each type of auction mechanism would implement
a particular type of pricing outcome. Bichler et al [2] have described in detail the role of
auctions in dynamic pricing, in the context of e-procurement, e-selling, bid preparation,
reverse logistics, etc. For this reason, we do not elaborate on this issue in this paper. A
companion paper in this special issue looks at combinatorial auctions [23] which represent an
important class of auction mechanisms being employed in e-business situations. The paper
by Elmaghraby is a focused survey on auctions and pricing in e-marketplaces [7].
There are excellent surveys on general auctions; for example, see [47–52]. The books by
Milgrom [53] and Vijay Krishna [54] are excellent treatises on general auction theory. There
is a popular on-line book on auctions by Klemperer [55]. There is a very comprehensive
recent book on combinatorial auctions by Cramton, Shoham, and Steinberg [56]. We refer
the reader to these and other references cited in this section.
6. Game theoretic models
Game theoretic models provide a natural tool to be used in modelling situations of conflict
and cooperation arising in the interaction of rational and selfish agents. In a market institution
consisting of multiple competing sellers, game theory provides an appropriate modelling
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tool. In fact, game theory provides the foundation for design of electronic markets [51]. Both
noncooperative game theory and cooperative game theory are relevant for modelling the
dynamic pricing problem in e-business markets.
There are a few studies of using a game theoretic approach for dynamic pricing in e-business
markets. For example, Bernstein and Federgruen [37,38] consider the dynamic pricing prob-
lem in a two echelon supply chain with one supplier servicing a network of competing retailers
under demand uncertainty. They assume a single period model in [38] and a periodic review
model in [37] and study an infinite horizon problem in both the cases. In [37], in each period,
a retailer faces a random demand whose distribution depends on his own retail price as well
as the prices charged by the other retailers. Two versions of the model are considered. In
the first model, each retailer incurs backlogging costs on backorders. In the second model,
appropriate inventory levels are induced by service level constraints of individual retailers.
Assuming that the supplier charges a constant per unit wholesale price, the model is shown
to induce a noncooperative game among the competing retailers. It is shown that under a
Nash equilibrium of this game, each retailer adopts a stationary retail price and a base stock
policy with a stationary base stock level. It is also shown that under a specific set of constant
wholesale prices, the aggregate system-wide long-run profits of the supplier and retailers are
as large as can be achieved in a fully centralized system.
Game theoretic models have recently been used in the area of pricing of network/internet
resources [57]. In network settings, dynamic pricing can be used as an effective means to
recover cost, to increase competition among different service providers, to reduce conges-
tion, and to control the traffic intensity. Game theoretic models become relevant because the
entities in a network are selfish and their interaction can be modelled as a noncooperative
or cooperative game. The paper by Cao, Shen, Milito, and Wirth [57] examines the use of
leader-follower games, cooperative games, and two person nonzero sum games in modelling
the Internet pricing problem. It is shown that models based on cooperative games provide the
most realistic way of modelling the Internet pricing problem. Game theoretic models which
have been used in the context of Internet pricing [58] and network pricing [59,60] can be
applied to e-business contexts in a fairly straightforward way.
7. Machine learning-based models
Machine learning has recently emerged as a popular modelling tool for dynamic pricing in e-
business. In a typical market, the environment constantly changes with demands and supplies
fluctuating all the way. In such a scenario, it is impossible to foresee all possible evolutions
of the system. The amount of information available is also limited (for example, a seller does
not have complete information about the pricing of the competing sellers). With learning-
based models, one can put all available data into perspective and change the pricing strategy
to adapt best to the environment. Data drive approaches for dynamic pricing (see Section 4)
can use machine learning techniques for determining dynamic prices.
There is a fair amount of literature available on this approach to dynamic pricing. This
literature can be logically classified into: single learning agent models and multiple learning
agent models. We will first describe a few models that employ a single learning agent.
7.1 Models with a single learning agent
In the paper by Brooks et al [61], the performance of two different pricing strategies (both
based on machine learning) is compared in the context of single seller markets for electronic
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goods. The first strategy uses a single parameter pricing model and the second one uses
a two parameter pricing model. It is shown that a dynamic pricing strategy based on two
parameter learning obviously outperforms the one based on one parameter learning. The paper
derives analytical methods to determining optimal prices for a model with partial information.
Simulations are used to explore a dynamic model in which the seller is uncertain about
customer valuations and learns the optimal prices gradually.
Gupta, Ravikumar, and Kumar [62] consider a web-based multi-unit Dutch auction where
the auctioneer progressively decrements per unit price of the items and model the problem of
finding a decrementing sequence of prices so as to maximize total expected revenue, in the
presence of uncertainty with regard to arrival pattern of bidders and their individual price-
demand curves. The above decision problem is modelled as a single agent RL in an uncertain
non-stationary auction environment. Under the assumption of independent bidder valuations,
the authors develop a finite horizon Markov decision process model with undiscounted returns
and solve it using a Q-learning algorithm.
Carvalho and Puterman [63] consider the problem of a retailer who has to set the price of a
good to optimize the total expected revenue over a period of timeT . When the demand function
is known, the situation reduces to a simple stochastic maximization problem. However, when
the demand function is not known, the retailer has to rely on uncertain prior information
to guide his pricing decisions. In this paper, a parametric model is considered in which the
parameters are unknown. For example, after t days of sale, a seller knows the prices he has
set on the preceding t−1 days and can observe the demands on the preceding t−1 days. The
model is a simple log-linear regression model, where the logarithm of the demand is a linear
function of the price. The seller can learn about the parameters of the demand function and
use it to set prices so as to maximize the revenues over a given time horizon. Several pricing
rules are studied and compared. It is shown that a one-step look-ahead rule performs fairly
robustly for a single seller environment studied.
Leloup and Deveaux [8] consider a web store and apply the dynamic pricing model of
Rothschild (1974) [64] to match the pricing problem of the web-store. Using simulations,
they study the price dynamics that can appear when all the sellers on a given market follow
an optimal pricing policy.
Raju, Narahari, and Ravikumar [65–68] look at electronic retail markets with a single
seller (without competition). The seller has an inventory of products which he replenishes
according to a standard inventory policy. The seller is the learning agent in the system and
uses reinforcement learning to learn from the environment. The problem is to determine
dynamic prices that optimize the seller’s performance metric (either long term discounted
profit or long run average profit per unit time). Under (reasonable) assumptions about the
arrival process of customers, valuations of the customers, inventory replenishment policy, and
replenishment lead time distribution, the system becomes a Markov decision process thus
enabling the use of RL algorithms. Q-learning algorithm for RL is used to solve the problem.
The model and solution methodology can also be used to compute optimal reorder quantity
and optimal reorder point for the inventory policy followed. This investigation is carried out
for two separate, representative situations:
 A retail market where nonlinear prices are offered to different quantities of the product
[66]. This is described in more detail in §7.
 A retail market where there are two natural segments of customers, captives and shoppers
[67,68]. Captives are mature, loyal buyers whereas shoppers are more price-sensitive and
are attracted by sales promotions and volume discounts.
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7.2 Models with multiple learning agents
We now describe a few representative models that employ two or more learning agents.
Ravikumar, Saluja, and Batra [69] study a service market environment with two sellers who
compete to service a stream of buyers who are of two varieties, informed and uninformed.
They assume that both the sellers follow an RL-based adaptive behaviour and model the
system as a general sum Markovian game. They propose an actor-critic type of RL scheme (a
variant of the scheme proposed by Konda and Borkar [70]) and provide experimental results
on convergence.
Hu [71] studies three different types of pricing algorithms (or pricing agents) in a simulated
market. The first agent uses reinforcement learning to determine the prices, by learning an
optimal action for one period based on the rewards it receives for that action. The second agent
uses a traditional Q-learning method, by learning about Q-values which represent long-term
optimal values for the agent’s own actions. The third agent uses a sophisticated Nash Q-
learning algorithm, by learning about Q-values which represent long-term Nash equilibrium
values for agent’s joint actions. The third agent performs better than the second and the second
outperforms the first agent in a simulated market where the agents compete with one another.
This shows that learning methods that take future rewards into account perform better than
myopic methods. Also, the learning method that takes into account the presence of other
agents performs better than the method that ignores other agents.
Greenwald, Kephart, and Tesuaro [72] attempt to understand the strategic pricebot dynam-
ics in a multi-seller environment where each seller employs a pricebot that employs a price-
setting strategy. They examine four different price-setting strategies: game theoretic pricing,
myoptimal pricing, derivative following, and Q-learning, which differ in their informational
and computational requirements. In homogeneous settings, when all the pricebots use the
same pricing algorithm, derivative following approach is shown to outperform game theo-
retic pricing and myoptimal pricing. In a market with heterogeneous pricebots, myoptimal
and game theoretic pricing outperform derivative following while the Q-learning strategy
outperforms all the others.
Kephart and Tesauro [73] study aspects of multi-agent Q-learning in a model market in
which two identical, competing pricebots strategically price a commodity. Two fundamentally
different solutions are observed: an exact, stationary solution with zero Bellman error con-
sisting of symmetric policies, and a non-stationary, broken-symmetry pseudo-solution, with
small but non-zero Bellman error. This pseudo-convergent asymmetric solution has no analog
in ordinary Q-learning. The authors compute analytically the form of both solutions, and map
out numerically the conditions under which each occurs. It is suggested that this observed
behaviour will also be found more generally in other studies of multi-agent Q-learning.
Dasgupta and Das [74] study the price dynamics in a multi-agent economy consisting
of multiple sellers and multiple buyers. Buyers use shopbots and sellers use pricebots. The
authors come up with a learning-based model optimizer algorithm that improves upon a naive
derivative following algorithm for dynamic pricing. Using simulation, they show that the use
of the model optimizer algorithm substantially improves the performance though it does not
have any additional information about the market. This shows that machine learning has an
influential role to play in fostering competition or cooperation, and in revenue maximization.
Raju, Narahari, and Ravikumar [65,75] consider an electronic retail market, where multiple
sellers compete on price to attract incoming buyers. In the markets considered, sellers employ
automated pricing agents or pricebots. A pricebot resets its seller’s price at random intervals
based on factors such as time, demand information, and supply availability, with the objective
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of maximizing discounted cumulative profit or long run average profit per unit time. Two
situations are investigated:
 Case 1: Here, no seller is aware of the states and prices of other sellers. The Q-learning
algorithm is used for the pricebot of a distinguished seller and its performance is com-
pared with that of pricebots that employ other adaptive techniques such as the well known
derivative following (DF) strategy.
 Case 2: Each seller has information about the states and prices of other sellers. Here, the
two seller dynamic pricing problem is modelled as a Markovian game and the problem is
formulated in the RL framework.
Related investigations are reported in the papers by Sridharan and Tesauro [76], Tesauro
and Kephart [77], and Tesauro [78]. Lawrence [79] considers the problem of pricing a bid
by a seller in a multi-seller procurement situation. Machine learning is used by seller agents
to learn directly the probability of winning from a database of bid transactions with known
outcomes. There are several other papers that use different forms of learning in determining
dynamic pricing strategies. These include use of learning in a queueing theoretic setting for
Internet pricing [80].
8. An example: Using reinforcement learning for dynamic pricing in an e-business
market
In this section, we present a reinforcement learning based approach for dynamic price deter-
mination in an electronic market with a single retailer. Specifically, we show how optimal
nonlinear dynamic prices can be determined in the presence of stochastic demands, price sen-
sitive customers, and inventory replenishments. This discussion is taken from [65,66]. The
following is a summary of this section.
 We consider a single seller retail store (such as amazon.com) which sells a designated
product and offers nonlinear pricing for multiple quantities in order to encourage volume
buying. By making reasonable assumptions on the seller’s inventory policy, replenishment
lead times, and the arrival process of the customers, we set up a Markov decision process
model for the dynamics of this system. In this model, the actions correspond to the prices
offered by the seller for different quantities of product bought. Without loss of generality,
we consider the situation where the store announces prices for one unit, two units, and three
units of the product.
 We show that the seller can use reinforcement learning strategies to modulate his prices
dynamically so as to maximize a chosen performance metric. We consider long run time
averaged profit as the performance metric. The seller uses Q-learning to learn the optimal
dynamic pricing policy.
 We show that the model and the methodology can be used to provide support for tactical
decision making such as determining the optimal reorder quantity and optimal reorder point.
We use the phrases seller, retailer, retail store interchangeably in the following discussion.
8.1 Description of system
We consider a retail store which offers nonlinear prices for different quantities of product.
Retail stores for goods like apparels, DVDs, food, beverages etc. would provide immediate
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examples. Imagine that the electronic retail store displays a pop-up menu that announces
“volume discounts for different volumes of purchase.” We consider, without loss of generality,
that the retail store offers three types of packages, one unit, two units, and three units. A
customer who clicks on the pop-up menu can be distinguished according to their volume
purchases (1, 2, or 3) as type-1, type-2, and type-3 respectively. Also, if the requested item
(items) is (are) not present, the store displays a lead time quote for an arriving customer and
customers wait for the items if the lead time promised is acceptable. We make the following
reasonable assumptions about the system dynamics.
 Customers arrive at the store according to a Poisson process with rate, . On arrival, a
customer looks at the menu displayed and self-selects her purchase volume. We assume
for our analysis that an arriving customer is of type-1 (that is, decides to purchase only one
unit) with probability f1, of type-2 (that is, decides to purchase two units) with probability
f2, and of type-3 (that is, decides to purchase three units) with probability .1 − f1 − f2/.
Effectively, this would mean that the arrivals of type-c (c D 1; 2; 3) customers constitute a
Poisson process with rate fi, where f3 D .1 − f1 − f2/.
 The seller maintains a finite inventory of the product. Imax is the maximum inventory
capacity at the seller’s store. The seller follows a standard inventory policy for replenishing
his inventory: whenever the inventory position (current inventory level at the retail store
plus the quantity of items ordered as replenishment) drops to a level less than r (called
the reorder point), he would order a replenishment of size .Imax − r/. Note that this is a
subtle variation of the classical .q; r/ inventory policy [81], with q D Imax and stochastic
replenishment time.
 When the number of items requested by waiting customers increases beyond a limit, say
N , the seller applies an admission control policy and turns away customers until such time
adequate replenishments arrive and the number of items for which customers are waiting
decreases to less than N .
 At any given time t , the seller posts a menu consisting of the following pricing options: a
price pc for customer type-c. Seller considers price p1 as base price. The seller chooses p2
(p3) in the following way. First, a uniformly distributed price range is chosen for p2 (p3)
by picking the upper and lower limits for the uniform distribution as p1b2min and p1b2max
(p1b3min and p1b3max), where b2min; b2max (b3min; b3max) are price bounds for choosing p2(p3).
The base price p1 is dynamically changed by the seller depending on the environment. In
fact, this is the central issue in this paper: how does the seller choose p1 in response to the
events in the system so as to maximize his profits?
 The replenishment lead time (time elapsed between placement of a replenishment order
and the arrival of the items) is exponentially distributed (with mean, say, 1=).
 If no items are available when a customer of type-c arrives, the customer would find
from the displayed menu, the current price pc and an expected lead time to get the
items. If the current unit price and the lead time quote are acceptable, the arriving cus-
tomer will commit for purchasing and stay on. If either the current price or the lead
time quote is not acceptable, the arriving customer leaves the system without purchasing.
We can assume a uniform distribution to specify the acceptable price range .Ccmin; Ccmax/
for customers of type-c and a second uniform distribution to specify an acceptable lead
time range .Dcmin;Dcmax/ for customers of type-c. Based on these two distributions and
the current quoted price and quoted lead time, we can easily determine the probabil-
ity that an incoming customer of type-c who finds no items in the retail store will stay
on.
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 We assume that the lead time quote w provided by the seller for all customers is always
the mean of the replenishment lead time, that is, 1=. This assumption is justified by the
inventory policy that we are using.
 An arriving customer of type-c measures her utility of a price quote pc and lead time quote
w by:
Uc.pc; w/ D [.1 − /.pc − pc/C .wc − w/]2.pc − pc/2.wc − w/; (1)
where 2.x/ D 1 if x  0 and is zero otherwise, and 0    1. pc  U.0; pcmax] and
wc  U.0; wcmax] with U.:/ denoting the uniform distribution over the specified interval
for given pmax and wmax.
 If customers of multiple types are competing for items, we choose a customer of a given
type with equal probability.
 When a customer arrives into the system, there is a certain amount of time required for
her to get the quotes and to decide whether to stay on or leave the system. We assume that
this duration is very small and equal to zero. One can assume an infinite server queue to
model this initial setup process, however, since that does not offer any more insights into
system behaviour, we safely assume the duration to be negligible. Similarly, once an item
is available, we assume a waiting customer would immediately take away the item, which
means we assume that the time taken for payment and packing is negligibly small. This
assumption also does not affect the system dynamics in a way that negates our analysis.
 The seller has a finite number of possible options (from set A) for setting his base price p1.
 The seller incurs an inventory holding cost HI per unit per unit time and a back order cost
Hq per unit per unit time. The purchasing cost/unit item is C. The ordering cost is assumed
to be negligible.
In this example, the seller is the learning agent. Each time a customer stays on or leaves the
system, the seller can learn the environment by observing the response to the dynamic prices.
If a customer of type-c decides to stay on, there is an assured reward of pc to the seller.
The costs incurred by the seller are: (1) purchasing cost for the items ordered by him, (2)
inventory holding cost for items stocked in the inventory, and (3) backorder costs on items for
which customers are made to wait. In this setting, we wish to enable the seller to dynamically
change the base price p1 optimally. The optimality could be with respect to a carefully chosen
performance metric. In this paper, we consider two performance metrics: (1) long term total
discounted profit the seller will accumulate (over an infinite time horizon) and (2) long run
profit per unit time the seller can make.
8.2 Reinforcement learning-based model
Figure 2 conceptualizes the retail store described in the previous section. The queue c is the
virtual queue containing waiting customers of type-c. Because of the assumptions about the
arrival process, replenishment process, the Markovian nature of the dynamics is immediate.
The state of the system is represented by the tuple .x1; x2; x3; I / where xc is the number of
waiting customers of type-c in queue c, and I is the inventory level at the retail store. The
possible set of actions at any state is the set A, from which the seller can choose price p1
(note that p2 and p3 are computed using p1, as explained later) to display. We assume that
prices are changed only at transition epochs. It is easy to see that the system dynamics and
control correspond to that of a Markov decision process [82,83].
Dynamic pricing models for electronic business 247
Figure 2. A model of a retail store with three customer segments.
Reinforcement learning procedures have been established as powerful and practical meth-
ods for solving decision problems in Markov decision processes [84,85]. RL expects a rein-
forcement signal from the environment indicating whether or not the latest move is in the
right direction. The Markov decision process described above is tailor made for the use of
reinforcement learning. The seller is a natural learning agent here. The customers are seg-
mented into type 1, type 2, and type 3 in a natural way and the seller can quickly identify
them. The seller can observe the queue sizes. He also knows the rewards incumbent upon the
entry or exit of customers. These rewards serve as the reinforcement signal for his learning
process.
Table 1 describes the notation for the example being discussed.
8.3 System dynamics
The queue, queue c in figure 1, at the retail store is a virtual queue for type-c customers.
Let X.t/ :D .X1.t/; X2.t/; X3.t/; I .t// be the state of the system at the retailer with Xc.:/
representing the number of back-logged requests in queue c and I .:/, the inventory level
at the retailer at time t . The retailer posts unit price quote .p1/ and the volume discount
alert on his web-page (prices p2 and p3) and will reset the prices only at transition epochs,
that is whenever a purchase happens (and hence the inventory drops) or when a request is
backlogged in either of the queues. Recall that the customer of type-c will purchase or make
a back log request only when Uc in (1) is positive. It is easy to see that price dynamics can
be modelled as a continuous time Markov decision process model. Below we give the state
dynamics.
At time 0, the process X.t/ is observed and classified into one of the states in the possible
set of states (denoted by S). After identification of the state, the retailer chooses a pricing
action from A. If the process is in state i and the retailer chooses p1 2 A, then
(i) the process transitions into state j 2 S with probability Pij .p1/
(ii) and further, conditional on the event that the next state is j , the time until next transition
is a random variable with probability distribution Fij .:jp1/.
After the transition occurs, pricing action is chosen again by the retailer and (i) and (ii) are
repeated. Further, in state i, for the action chosen p1, the resulting reward, Sp.:/, the inventory
cost, H.i/ and the backorder cost C.i; j/ costs are as follows: Let i D [x1; x2; x3; i1] and
j D [x 01; x 02; x 03; i 01].
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Table 1. Notation for the model of the retail store.
 Rate of Poisson arrivals at the retail store
 Rate of exponentially distributed replenishment lead time
fc Probability of arrival of type - c customers, c D 1; 2; 3
pc Price of c items offered for type - c customers, c D 1; 2; 3
Xc.t/ Number of waiting customers of type - c at time t , c D 1; 2; 3
I .t/ Inventory level at the retail store at time t
.X1.t/; X2.t/; X3.t/; I .t// Instantaneous state of the system
S State-space of the Markov chain
Pij .p1/ Probability of transitioning to state j from state i
when action p1 is chosen
Fij .:jp1/ Cumulative distribution function of time until next
transition with current state i, next state j , and action p1
Imax Maximum inventory capacity at the retail store
q Parameter that decides the quantity of replenishment ordered
r Reorder point for the inventory replenishment policy
N Maximum number of customer orders allowed in queue
w Lead time quote offered to the customers; w D 1=
Uc.pc; w/ Utility of an arriving customer for a price quote pc
and a lead time quote w
A Finite set of price options available for p1
HI Per unit per unit time inventory holding cost
Hq Per unit per unit time back order cost
C Purchasing cost per unit of product
 : S ! A A stationary deterministic pricing policy
 : S ! A Optimal pricing policy
J.i/ Expected long run average reward for policy 
Sp.i; a; j/ Reward when action a is chosen in state i, and next state j
H.i/ Inventory holding cost in state i
C.i; j/ Backorder cost with current state i and next state j
Q.i; p/ Q-value associated with action p in state i
Sp.i; a; j/ D pc.x
0
c − xc/ if x
0
c > xc for c D 1; 2; 3:
D pc if .i1 − i
0
1/ D cI xc D 0
D 0 otherwise
C.i; j/ D
[
3∑
cD1
c.xc − x
0
c/
C C .i
0
1 − i1/
C
]
C
H.i/ D
3∑
cD1
.xcHq/C i1HI
 Remark. Let p1 represent the seller’s base price in the observed states. Then the following
transitions occur.
– [0; x2; x3; i1] ! [0; x2; x3; i1 −1] with rate f1P .U1.p1; 1/ > 0/ 8 x2; x3 and i1
– [0; 0; x3; i1] ! [0; 0; x3; i1 − 2] with rate f2P .U2.p2; 1/ > 0/ 8 x3 and
2  i1 < 3
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– [0; 0; 0; i1] ! [0; 0; 0; i1 − 3] with rate f3P .U3.p3; 1/ > 0/ 8 i1  3
– [x1; x2; x3; 0] ! [x1 C 1; x2; x3; 0] with rate f1P .U1.p1; 1/ > 0/ 8x2; x3
– [x1; x2; x3; 0] ! [x1; x2 C 1; x3; 0] with rate f2P .U2.p2; 1/ > 0/ 8x1; x3
– [x1; x2; x3; 0] ! [x1; x2; x3 C 1; 0] with rate f3P .U3.p3; 1/ > 0/ 8x1; x2.
8.4 Expected long run average reward
Let  : S ! A denote a stationary deterministic pricing policy, followed by the retailer,
that selects an action only based on the state information. Let t0 D 0 and let ftngn1 be the
sequence of successive transition epochs under policy  and X.tn−/ denote the state of the
system just before tn.
In this case, the performance metric, expected long run averaged reward starting from state
i for the policy  will be
J.i/ D lim sup
M!1
1
M
E
[
M−1∑
nD0
[Sp.X.tn−/; .X.tn−//; X.tn//
−C.X.tn−/; X.tn//−H.X.tn−//]jX0 D i
]
: (2)
The retailer’s problem is to find  : S ! A such that
J .i/ D max

J.i/: (3)
Let us assume that s is a special state, which is recurrent in the Markov chain for every
stationary policy. Consider a sequence of generated states, and divide it into cycles such
that each of these cycles can be viewed as a state trajectory of a corresponding stochas-
tic maximized profit path problem with state s as the termination state. For any scalar ,
let us consider the stochastic maximized profit path problem with expected stage profit∑
j Pij .p/[Sp.i; p; j/ − C.i; j/ − H.i/] −  for all i. Now we can argue that if we fix the
expected stage profit obtained at state i to be
∑
j Pij .p/[Sp.i; p; j/−C.i; j/−H.i/]− ,
where  is the optimal average profit per stage from state s, then the associated stochas-
tic maximized profit path problem becomes equivalent to the initial average profit per stage
problem.
Bellman’s equation takes the form:
 C h.i/ D max
p
∑
j
Pij [Sp.i; p; j/− C.i; j/−H.i/C h.j/]; (4)
where  is the optimal average profit per stage, and h.i/ has the interpretation of a relative
or differential profit for each state i with respect to the special state s.
8.4a Q-Learning for long run average reward: An appropriate form of the Q-learning
algorithm can be written as explained in [86,83], where the Q-value is defined as h.i/ D
maxpQ.i; p/,
QnC1.i; p/ D Qn.i; p/C γn[Sp.i; p; j/− C.i; j/−HI.i/Tij −Hq.i/Tij
Cmax
b
Qn.j; b/− max
c
Qn.t; c/−Q.i; p/]; (5)
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where j , Sp.i; p; j/ and C.i; j/ are generated from the pair .i; p/ by simulation, and Tij
is the average sample time taken by the system for moving from state i to state j while
collecting samples through simulation. We have to choose a sequence of step sizes γn such
that
∑
γn D 1 and
∑
γ 2n <1.
8.5 A simulation experiment
We simulate and study an instance of the retail store model shown in figure 2, by considering
an action set (that is, set of possible prices) A D f80; 90; 100; 105; 110; 115; 120; 125;
130; 135g. The maximum queue capacities are assumed to be 10 each for queue 1, queue 2,
and queue 3 (this means we do not allow more than 10 of any type of customers in the retail
store). The maximum inventory level Imax is assumed to be 20 with a reorder point at r D 10.
With these parameter values, the state space of the underlying Markov decision process has
161 states. We assume that f1 D 04; f2 D 03. We consider customers as arriving in Poisson
fashion with mean inter-arrival time 15 minutes. The upper and lower limits for the uniform
distribution that describes acceptable price range for type-1 customers are assumed to be 8
and 14, respectively. These limits are assumed to be 12 and 245 for type-2 customers and
18 and 35 for type-3 customers. The upper and lower limits for the uniform distribution that
describes acceptable lead time range are assumed to be 0 hours and 12 hours, respectively.
We consider exponential replenishment lead time for reorders with a mean of 3 hours. The
inventory holding cost (HI ) is chosen as 05 per unit per day and the backorder cost (Hq) is
chosen as 80 per back order per day. We assume that the seller purchases the items at a unit
cost of 4.
We consider the steady state or long run profit per unit time as the performance metric.
8.5a Optimal values of reorder quantity and reorder point: Assuming the maximum inven-
tory capacity at the retail store to be 20, we simulated the system for different values of q
Table 2. Long run average profit per unit time for different .q; r/ values.
.q; r/ values Long run average profit per unit time
(1,19) −1808
(2,18) 0873
(3,17) 3934
(4,16) 6611
(5,15) 8442
(6,14) 9313
(7,13) 10193
(8,12) 10768
(9,11) 11189
(10,10) 11431
(11,9) 11723
(12,8) 11991
(13,7) 12113
(14,6) 12117
(15,5) 12370
(16,4) 12541
(17,3) 12413
(18,2) 12533
(19,1) 12107
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Table 3. Long run average profit per unit time for a (10,10) policy
optimized over different replenishment lead times.
Mean replenishment Cost per unit Long run average
lead time (min) for the seller profit per unit time
180 5 10100
240 45 10922
300 425 11254
360 4 11431
540 3 9024
and r in the .q; r/ inventory policy used. See table 2. Note that q is the reorder quantity,
while r is the reorder point. From the table, it is clear that a reorder point of 4 and a reorder
quantity of 16 are optimal. This means we do not reorder until the inventory position (inven-
tory level at the retail store plus the quantity already ordered) goes lower than 4 and when
that happens, we place a replenishment order for a quantity of 16. This is a fairly counter-
intuitive result, which shows the complex nature of interactions that govern the dynamics of the
system.
8.5b Effect of replenishment lead time: We now study the effect of slower or faster replen-
ishments. Physically speaking, this is equivalent to ordering replenishments from different
distributors. Faster replenishments are naturally associated with higher cost, which is reflected
by a higher per unit cost paid by the seller to the distributor. Table 3 provides the results for
five different combinations of mean replenishment lead time and cost per unit. The results are
quite interesting and show that faster replenishments, even if only marginally more expen-
sive, do not guarantee maximization of profit. At the same time, slower replenishments, even
if only marginally less expensive, also do not guarantee optimality. Determining the optimal
mix of lead time guarantee and per unit cost is a delicate decision that is best left to such
models than to plain intuition.
8.6 Optimal nonlinear prices
We can use the model to determine the best range of discounted prices to choose for differ-
ent quantities, for a given mean replenishment lead time and cost per unit incurred by the
seller. Table 4 shows three different combinations of price ranges for selling 2 items and
3 items. Determining an optimal such combination is best done through a model such as
this.
Table 4. Long run average profit per unit time for a .10; 10/ policy optimized over different price
ranges for type-2 and type-3 customers.
Mean replenishment Cost per unit Price range Price range Long run average
lead time (min) for seller for 2 items for 3 items profit per unit time
360 4 (15, 175) (225, 25) 11431
360 4 (175, 200) (25, 275) 10033
360 4 (125, 15) (20, 225) 7878
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9. Conclusion
9.1 Summary
It is very clear that advances in internet and e-commerce technologies have opened up rich
opportunities for reaping the benefits of dynamic pricing. Companies resorting to dynamic
pricing strategies are increasing in number steadily. Moreover, increasingly complex dynamic
pricing strategies are being tried out. In this paper, we have covered the following topics.
 We have shown that the fixed pricing paradigm is giving way to a dynamic pricing paradigm
in e-business markets and that dynamic pricing strategies, when properly used, outperform
fixed pricing strategies.
 We have defined various terms and keywords used in the context of dynamic pricing and
provided a categorization of dynamic pricing strategies.
 Conditions under which dynamic pricing strategies will outperform fixed pricing strategies
have been enunciated.
 We have categorized and discussed dynamic pricing models under four heads: (1) inventory
based models (2) data driven models (3) auction based models (4) machine learning based
models based models (2) data driven models (3) auction based models (4) machine learning
based models.
 We brought out the role of reinforcement learning based approaches for dynamic pricing
and discussed a single seller example with nonlinear pricing used for different quantities.
The main message of this paper is that e-business markets are ready for dynamic pricing,
however the prices will have to be modulated in fairly sophisticated ways, based on sound
mathematical models, to realize the benefits of dynamic pricing.
9.2 Future work
Current research in this area is focusing on originating increasingly sophisticated methods
for dynamic pricing. In the area of auctions, the issue of pricing is closely tied up with truth
revelation by bidders. One issue that would need to be studied is how to design truth revealing
auction mechanisms that also provide efficient dynamic pricing strategies.
Machine learning based models for dynamic pricing is now an active area of research.
The most important problem that requires resolution here is that of multi-agent learning. An
equally important issue concerns the computational efficiency of learning based mechanisms.
Development of powerful market simulators is another critical area. Real world mod-
elling of markets, buying behaviour, seller behaviour, dynamic pricing strategies etc. is an
extremely important topic.
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